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I. INTRODUCTION1
* Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law, University of Michigan;
Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. There is a vast literature on this subject. For a good sampling, see 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1-373 (3d
ed. 1996); Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 757 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565 (1955); Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather
than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Tracey Maclin,
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1994); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 665 (1970); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should
Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363; Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994); Potter Stewart, The
Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983); John
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About a quarter-century ago, after my co-authors and I had
published the fourth edition of our criminal procedure casebook,2 I
attended a conference with A. Kenneth Pye, then the Dean of the
Duke Law School. During a break in the conference proceedings,
Dean Pye, a strong admirer of the Warren Court,3 took me aside to
give me some advice about casebook writing. This is a fairly accurate
recollection of what Dean Pye said:
On thumbing through the new edition of your casebook, I couldn't
help noticing that you have eliminated a number of the pre-Warren
Court cases you had in the earlier editions. I realize you were
responding to the need to add a good deal of new material to the
book without letting an already big book get any larger. But taking
out the old cases has serious costs. In the years ahead, as more and
more interesting new cases are handed down, you will feel much
pressure to take out still more older cases. But this is a process you
must resist.
Otherwise, by the time you and your co-authors publish your
eighth o& tenth edition, the confessions chapter will begirq with
Miranda and the search and seizure chapter with Mapp. This
would be calamitous. For many law students (and a few young
criminal procedure professors) won't appreciate Mapp and
Miranda-won't really understand why the Court felt the need to
take the big steps it did-unless casebooks like yours contain
material that enables readers of the books to get some idea of how
unsatisfactory the prevailing rules and doctrines were before the
Warren Court arrived on the scene.
I think Dean Pye's advice about casebook writing was sound,6 and
Barker Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REV. 169 (1955); Silas
Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a
Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984); John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922). It is very hard to select
the best long article ever written on the exclusionary rule, but it is relatively easy to pick
the best short one-William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1997).
2. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1974).
3. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 249 (1968). At the time he gave me advice about writing criminal procedure
casebooks, Pye was one of the nation's leading criminal procedure commentators, but in
later years Pye's administrative obligations as law school dean, university chancellor and
university president diverted his efforts from legal scholarship. See generally Francis A.
Allen, The Scholarship of Kenneth Pye, 49 SMU L. REV. 439 (1996).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. Our casebook is now in its tenth edition. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 2002). The chapter on search and seizure still does not
begin with Mapp; the chapter on confessions still does not begin with Miranda.
[Vol. 26
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what he had to say also applies to discussions and debates about such
issues as the search and seizure exclusionary rule. We cannot (at least
we should not) begin with Mapp v. Ohio. We need a prelude.
II. THE PRE-MAPP ERA
Perhaps we should begin with People v. Cahan,7 the pre-Mapp case
in which California adopted the exclusionary rule on its own
initiative. At first, Justice Roger Traynor, who wrote the majority
opinion, had not been a proponent of the exclusionary rule. Indeed,
thirteen years earlier, he had written the opinion of the California
Supreme Court reaffirming the admissibility of illegally seized
evidence. By 1955, he and a majority of his colleagues felt
compelled to overrule state precedents and adopt the exclusionary
rule. Why? The Cahan majority explained:
[O]ther remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with
the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the
attendant result that the courts under the old rule [of admissibility]
have been constantly required to participate in, and iR effect
condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
Justice Traynor and his colleagues seemed astounded by how
casually and routinely illegally seized evidence was being offered and
admitted in the California courts. After noting that Los Angeles police
had candidly admitted that they had illegally installed listening
devices in the defendants' homes and had described, with equal
candor, how they had forcibly entered buildings without bothering to
obtain warrants by breaking windows and kicking in doors," Justice
Traynor observed:
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law
enforcement officers . . . frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant
[unconstitutional] acts . . . . It is clearly apparent from their
7. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
8. Prior to Mapp, state courts were free to admit or to exclude illegally seized evidence.
In 1949, thirty-one states declined to exclude such evidence. A decade later, on the eve of
Mapp, twenty-four states still rejected the exclusionary rule. See Yale Kamisar, The
Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment
More than "an Empty Blessing ", 62 JUDICATURE 337, 346 (1979).
9. See People v. Gonzales, 124 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1942). What is even more ironic is that in
1942 Earl Warren was the California Attorney General who successfully urged Justice
Traynor and his colleagues to reaffirm the rule permitting the use of illegally seized
evidence. See id.
10. Cahan, 282 P.2d at 911-12.
11. See id. at 906 (citation omitted).
No. 1]
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testimony that [Los Angeles police officers] casually regard [their
illegal acts] as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary
duties for which the City employs and pays them.
Perhaps we should go back in time still further, three-quarters of a
century, to People v. Defore,13 the occasion for Judge (later Justice)
Cardozo's famous opinion explaining why New York would not
adopt the federal exclusionary rule. Cardozo maintained, as have most
critics of the exclusionary rule ever since, that excluding the illegally
seized evidence was not the only effective way to enforce the Fourth
Amendment (or its state constitutional counterpart): "The [offending]
officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even
prosecuted for oppression. He was subject to removal or other
discipline at the hands of his superiors.
Two decades later, in Wolf v. Colorado, when the Supreme Court
declined to impose the federal exclusionary rule on the states as a
matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the Wolf majority, per
Justice Frankfurter, made a similar argument. Indeed, the Court relied
partly on what it called Cardozo's "[w]eighty testimony" about the
• 16
availability of various alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
The states that had rejected the federal exclusionary rule, Justice
Frankfurter assured us had "not left the right to privacy without other
,,17
means of protection. It could not, therefore, be "regard[ed] as a
departure from basic standards to remand [victims of unlawful
searches and seizures] to the remedies of private action and such
protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an
alert public opinion, may afford."'
' 8
A majority of the Court took a very different view of the various
alternatives (perhaps one should say, theoretical alternatives) to the
12. Id. at 907. See also Roger Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962
DuKE L. J. 319 (1962):
My misgivings about [the admissibility of illegally seized evidence] grew as I
observed that time after time it was being offered and admitted as a routine
procedure. It became impossible to ignore the corollary that illegal searches and
seizures were also a routine procedure subject to no effective deterrent; else how
could illegally obtained evidence come into court with such regularity?
Id. at 321-22.
13. 150 N.E. 585 (NY App. Ct. 1926).
14. Id. at 586-87.
15. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. Id. at 31. The Court quoted from Judge Cardozo's Defore opinion at considerable
length. See id. at 31-32 n.2.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id. at 31.
[Vol. 26
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exclusionary rule a dozen years later when it handed down Mapp v.
Ohio,19 overruling Wolf. This time the Court dismissed alternatives to
the exclusionary rule, noting that "[t]he experience of California that
such other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by
the experience of other States." 20 But the Court had nothing specific
to say about the experience in any state other than California nor did
it rely on empirical studies. Instead, the Court relied on comments by
Justice Traynor in Cahan.
Asserting that the various alternatives to the exclusionary rule are
worthless (or quoting statements by the California Supreme Court to
the same effect) does not necessarily make them so-just as asserting
(or assuming) that alternative remedies are meaningful (as both
Cardozo and Frankfurter did) does not make that so. Fortunately,
impressive evidence of the ineffectiveness of the so-called
alternatives to the exclusionary rule does exist. But it is not to be
found in the Mapp opinion itself. It is to be found rather in the
reaction of law enforcement officials to the Mapp decision. To
borrow a phrase, this reaction is the "weighty testimony" that
(despite the claims of Cardozo, Frankfurter, and others) reliance on
tort remedies, criminal prosecutions, and the internal discipline of the
police indeed left "the right to privacy without other means of
22protection.
I1. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO MAPP
Although Michael Murphy, the police commissioner of New York
City at the time, did not say so in so many words, he left no doubt that
because New York courts (relying on the Defore case) had permitted
the prosecution to use illegally seized evidence up to the time of
Mapp, neither the commissioner nor the thousands of officers who
worked for him had been taking the law of search and seizure at all
seriously. As the commissioner recalled some time later:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law
enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as
[Mapp]. As the then commissioner of the largest police force in
this country I was immediately caught up in the entire problem of
reevaluating our procedures, which had followed the Defore rule,
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. Id. at 652.
21. Wolf, 338 U.S. at31.
22. Id. at 30.
No. 1]
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and . . . creating new policies and new instructions for the
implementation of Mapp .. . [Decisions such as Mapp] create
tidal waves and earthquakes which require rebuilding of our
institutions sometimes from their very foundations upward.
Retraining sessions had to be held from the very top administrators
down to each of the thousands of foot patrolr~en and detectives
engaged in the daily basic enforcement function.
Why was Mapp's effect so "dramatic and traumatic"? Why did it
create "tidal waves and earthquakes"? Why did it require "retraining"
from top to bottom? Had there been any search and seizure training
before Mapp?
What did the commissioner mean when he told us that prior to
Mapp his police department's procedures "had followed the Defore
case"? Defore did not set forth any procedures or permit the police to
establish any procedures other than those that complied with the
Fourth Amendment. It did allow New York prosecutors to use
illegally seized evidence, but it did not (as the commissioner seemed
to think) allow New York police to commit illegal searches and
seizures. Is there any better evidence of the inadequacies of the
existing alternatives to the exclusionary rule than the police reaction
to the imposition of the rule?
24
It appears that, prior to Mapp, New York prosecutors were also
unfamiliar with and uninterested in the law of search and seizure.
Professor Richard Uviller, a New York prosecuting attorney at the
time Mapp was handed down, recalled that he "cranked out a crude
summary" of federal search and seizure law just in time for the next
state convention of district attorneys and that summary turned out to
be "an instant runaway best seller. It was as though we had made a
belated discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the State of
New York. . . ." That, I think, says it all.
The response of New York law enforcement officials to the
23. Michael Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The
Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEx. L. REv. 939, 941 (1966) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
24. If any police official's post-Mapp comments are more revealing than Commissioner
Murphy's, it may be those of New York City Deputy Police Commissioner Leonard
Reisman. Reisman told a large group of police officers why they had to learn the law of
seizure at such a late date in their careers: "[In the past] nobody bothered to take out search
warrants.... [T]he Supreme Court had ruled that evidence obtained without a warrant-
illegally if you will-was admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?"
Sidney E. Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1965, at A50.
25. H. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some
Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REv. 501, 502 (1982).
[Vol. 26
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imposition of the search and seizure rule is hardly unique. Six years
earlier, when the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary
rule on its own initiative in People v. Cahan, the reaction of the Los
Angeles Chief of Police, William Parker, had been quite similar to the
one his New York City counterpart displayed when Mapp was
decided.27
In Pennsylvania-another state whose courts had admitted illegally
seized evidence prior to Mapp-a young Philadelphia assistant
district attorney (and a future U.S. Senator), Arlen Specter, left little
doubt that in this state, too, the so-called alternative remedies to the
exclusionary rule had had virtually no effect. Commissioner Murphy
had likened Mapp to a "tidal wave" and an "earthquake"; Mr. Specter
compared it to a revolution:
Police practices and prosecution procedures were revolutionized in
many states by the holding in . . . Mapp v. Ohio that evidence
obtained from an illegal search and seizure cannot be used in a
criminal proceeding.... [There are indications] that the imposition
of the exclusionary rule upon the states is the most significant
event in criminal law since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment .... Mapp has rewritten the criminal law treatise for
states wlich had admitted evidence regardless of how it was
obtained.
Mr. Specter, like Commissioner Murphy, seemed to equate the
relevance of the law of search and seizure with the presence or
absence of the exclusionary rule, a remedy for the violation of a body
of law the police were supposed to be obeying all along:
[T]he Mapp decision has significantly impaired the ability of the
police to secure evidence to convict the guilty . . . . The law
abiding citizen who must walk on some Philadelphia streets at two
o'clock in the morning would doubtless prefer to be subjected to a
search, without any cause, and have the police do the same to the
26. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955); see supra note 7and accompanying text.
27. Chief Parker told the public that the commission of a serious crime would no longer
"justify affirmative police action until such time as the police have armed themselves with
sufficient information to constitute 'probable cause."' WILLIAM H. PARKER, POLICE 117
(Wilson ed., 1957), quoted in Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1153-54 (1959). He
also pledged that he and his officers would work "within the framework of limitations"
imposed by the law of search and seizure "[a]s long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of
California." Id. at 131. For substantial extracts from Chief Parker's responses to the Cahan
decision and for comments on his reaction, see Kamisar, supra, at 1153-54.
28. Arlen Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 4 (1962).
No. 1]
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man s~nding idly at a comer; but that cannot be done under
Mapp.
IV. HAS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE INHIBITED THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES?
One can hear the critics of the exclusionary rule now. Mapp v.
Ohio, some say, removed both the incentive and the opportunity to
develop effective alternative means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren Burger once said that "the
continued existence of [the exclusionary rule] inhibits the
development of rational alternatives. 30 However, it is hard to take
this argument seriously.
First of all, as opponents of the exclusionary rule never tire of
telling us, large portions of police activity relating to the seizing of
criminal property do not produce (and may not even have been
designed to produce) incriminating evidence, and thus do not result in
31
criminal prosecutions. Whatever the reason for the failure to impose
direct sanctions on the offending officers in these instances, it cannot
be the existence of the exclusionary rule. The issue need not, and
should not, be framed in terms of whether we should enforce the
Fourth Amendment by an exclusionary rule or tort remedies against
the offending officers or departmental sanctions. Nothing prevents the
use of "internal sanctions" against the police "simultaneously with the
use of the exclusionary rule. 32 After all, "[n]o proponent of the
exclusionary rule has suggested that it should act in isolation. 33
Moreover, blaming the failure to develop any effective "direct
sanctions" against offending police officers on the exclusionary rule
itself, to borrow a phrase from Carol Steiker, "ignores history." For
many decades a large number of states had no exclusionary rule, yet
29. Id. at 42.
30. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent
Privacy Violations), 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 463-64 (1997) (describing
alternate benefits of illegal evidence seizure).
32. Cf. A. Kenneth Pye, Charles Fahy and the Criminal Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1072
(1966) (explaining that exclusionary rule is invoked because of failure of "internal
sanctions" above).
33. Id.
34. Steiker, supra note 1, at 849; see also Kamisar, supra note 8, at 346, 350
(describing lack of initiative on part of states to develop alternatives between adoption of
federal exclusionary rule and decisions of Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Wolf, 338 U.S.
25 (1949)).
[Vol. 26
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none of them produced any meaningful alternatives to the rule.
Almost half a century passed between the time the federal courts
adopted the exclusionary rule35 and the time the Court finally imposed
the rule on the states. But in all that time, not one of the twenty-four
states that still admitted illegally seized evidence on the eve of Mapp
36had developed an effective alternative to the rule. Thus, five decades
of post-Weeks "freedom" from the inhibiting effect of the federal
exclusionary rule failed to produce any meaningful alternative to the
exclusionary rule in any jurisdiction.
One can hear the critics of the exclusionary rule again. Some of
them are telling us that times have changed. Have they?
V. ARE TODAY'S POLITICIANS MORE LIKELY TO IMPOSE EFFECTIVE
"DIRECT SANCTIONS" AGAINST THE POLICE THAN THE POLITICIANS
OF YESTERYEAR?
Is there any reason to believe that today's or tomorrow's politicians
are, or will be, any less fearful of appearing "soft on crime" or any
more interested in protecting people under investigation by the police
than the politicians of any other era? Is there any reason to think that
the lawmakers of our day are any more willing than their predecessors
to invigorate tort remedies (or any other "direct sanction") against
police officers who act overzealously in the pursuit of "criminals"?
"If anything," observes Carol Steiker, "the escalating public
hysteria over violent crime from the 1960s through the present makes
it is [sic] even more 'politically suicidal' today to support restrictions
on police behavior than it was before 1961." 37 Consider, too, the
disheartening comments of Donald Dripps:
American legislatures consistently have failed to address defects in
the criminal process, even when they rise to crisis-level
proportions. For example, when the Miranda Court invited
Congress and the states to experiment with alternatives to
traditional backroom police interrogation, Congress responded by
adopting Title II [of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968], which stubbornly insisted on the traditional practice.
To this day only two American jurisdictions, Alaska and
Minnesota, require taping interrogations. In both instances the state
35. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
37. Steiker, supra note 1, at 850 (citation omitted); see also Amsterdam, supra note 1,
at 379 ("[T]here will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in American society to
keep our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of police control.").
No. 1]
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courts, rather than the state legislature, were the source of reform.
Legislatures across the United States have found billions of dollars
for prisons, but the support for indigent defense is shamefully
inadequate. No legislature has adopted reforms of police
identification procedures, even though we have known since the
1930s that mistaken identification is the leading cause of false
convictions. Legislatures . . . have not adopted statutory
requirements for judicial warrants, or the preservation of
exculpatory evidence, or plugged holes in the exclusionary rule, let
alone delivered the effective tort remedy exclusionary rule critics
have advocated for decades.
The record is not an accident, but the product of rational political
incentives. Almost everyone has an interest in controlling crime.
Only young men, disproportionately black, are at significant risk of
erroneous prosecution for garden-variety felonies. Abuses of police
search and seizure or interrogation powers rarely fall upon middle-
aged, middle-class citizens.... [S]o long as the vast bulk of police
and prosecutorial power targets the relatively powerless (and when
will that ever be otherwise?), criminal procedure rules that limit
public pover will come from the courts or they will come from
nowhere.
A new book by Welsh White relates an incident that illustrates the
formidable political power possessed by the law enforcement
community. As the result of a lawsuit brought by an alleged victim
of abusive police interrogation practices, a police investigator looked
into charges against a Chicago police commander and those working
for him. He concluded that for a period of more than ten years the
commander and his men had been torturing suspects into confessing.
In 1993, the commander was dismissed from the police force.42 But
allegations of police misconduct continued to fill the air. For example,
ten Illinois prisoners on death row maintained that the Chicago
commander and his men had extracted confessions from them by
38. See, e.g., Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of
Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2067 (2000) (alluding to congressional and
local jurisdictional decreases in resources devoted to indigent defense).
39. See also Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court
and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 542 (1975) (deploring the fact that
Congress simply attempted to repeal the 1967 Supreme Court cases extending right to
counsel to police lineups without offering anything in their place).
40. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson,
Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
45-46 (2001) (citations omitted).
41. See WELSHS. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS 128-36 (2001).
42. See id. at 130.
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43
torture.
In the wake of the controversy surrounding these alleged police
torture cases, the Illinois legislature at one point seemed prepared to
enact a law requiring the police to video or audiotape their
interrogation practices. But the law enforcement community
expressed its strong opposition to the bill, claiming that it would
create new obstacles and expand the rights of the accused "at the
expense of crime victims, public safety and law enforcement." 44 The45
bill died in committee.
As Justice Traynor noted long ago in Cahan, "even when it
becomes generally known that the police conduct illegal searches and
seizures, public opinion is not aroused as it is in the case of other
violations of constitutional rights" because illegal arrests and
unlawful searches "lack the obvious brutality of coerced confessions
and the third degree and do not so clearly strike at the very basis of
our civil liberties as do unfair trials ... ,46 Moreover, unlike the
Chicago torture cases, illegal searches and seizures do not raise
doubts as to a defendant's innocence. If the police and their allies can
crush legislative reform efforts in the confessions area as decisively as
they did in the wake of the Chicago police scandal-despite serious
questions about the guilt of a number of people on death row-how
much difficulty will they have defeating legislative proposals to
impose direct sanctions on them for committing Fourth Amendment
violations?
One half of Judge Guido Calabresi's proposed alternative to the
exclusionary rule is to imPose a system of "direct punishment" on the
offending police officer. Perhaps Judge Calabresi has in mind the
imposition of substantial fines, suspensions without pay, or dismissal
from the force, depending on the seriousness of the officer's Fourth
Amendment violation. One fails to see, however, why this part of his
proposal will fare any better in the political arena than many other
"direct sanction" proposals that have failed over the years.
43. See id. at 130-31.
44. Id. at 136.
45. See id.
46. 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955).
47. Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 116
(2002).
No. 11
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VI. POLICE PERJURY AND JUDICIAL "WINKING"
48As other critics of the exclusionary rule have done, Judge
Calabresi notes that the police frequently lie in court to evade the
exclusionary rule.49 Still worse, there is good reason to believe that in
a significant number of cases, judges "knowingly accept police
perjury as truthful.",50 There are at least two responses to this criticism
of the exclusionary rule.
First, Myron Orfield's interviews with approximately forty Chicago
criminal division judges, prosecutors, and public defenders left no
doubt that police perjury and judicial toleration of it were widespread,
but he concluded:
Although recognizing the [exclusionary] rule's imperfections,
respondents believe it is the only mechanism that injects any
restraint in the system, or any respect for rights. Though often
evaded, the respondents believe that by creating a possibility of
suppression, the rule makeA the Fourth Amendment a factor in
police and judicial thinking.
Critics might also argue that pervasive perjury is a cost of the
exclusionary rule, and as such, outweighs any incremental benefit
gained by the rule's uneven deterrent effect. Respondents ...
nevertheless believe that the exclusionary rule has dramatically
improved police behavior and should be retained.... Today, while
police often perjure themselves, they also, because of the
exclusionary rule, often obey the Fourth Amendment. By any
measure, this is an improvement [over pre-Mapp days]. :
Second, as Laurie Levenson recently observed, there is no evidence
and no reason to believe "that a police officer will be any less
motivated to lie in an administrative hearing, where [his] reputation
and job position are at risk, than in a criminal proceeding where the
court threatens to exclude evidence." "[lIt is important to realize,"
48. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 677 (1998).
49. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 113.
50. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 83 (1992).
The study was based on interviews with thirteen judges, eleven prosecutors, and fourteen
public defenders in the Chicago criminal court system. See id. at 81.
51. Id. at 123.
52. Id. at 132.
53. Laurie L. Levenson, Administrative Replacements: How Much Can They Do?, 26
PEPP. L. REV. 879, 881 (1999).
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admonishes Orfield, in the course of concluding his study of Chicago
narcotics officers, "that any remedial scheme that im oses a personal
sanction on an officer is likely to encourage perjury."
VII. THE COSTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As many other critics of the exclusionary rule have done,55 Judge
Calabresi assumes that the criminal defendant who benefits from the
application of the search and seizure exclusionary rule will often be aS56
murderer or rapist. However, an empirical study by Thomas Davies,
called "[t]he most careful and balanced assessment conducted to date
. ,57
of all available empirical data," reveals that the exclusion of
evidence in murder, rape, and other violent cases is exceedingly58
rare. "The most striking feature of the data," reports Davies, "is the
concentration of illegal searches in drug arrests (and possibly
weapons possession arrests) and the extremelY small effects in arrests
for other offenses, including violent crimes."
54. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1055 (1987).
This study, based on interviews with twenty-six narcotics officers in the Chicago Police
Department, was conducted while Orfield was still a law student. Seven years later when
Orfield published his second empirical study, he reported that "many" of the judges,
prosecutors and public defenders interviewed expressed the view "that to the extent a tort
remedy would actually impose damages on police officers, it would cause the police to
perjure themselves even more frequently [than they do now to thwart the impact of the
exclusionary rule]." Orfield, supra note 50, at 126.
It strikes me that what Orfield has to say about tort actions applies to administrative
sanctions as well. An officer is likely to be just as fearful about being dismissed or
suspended (without pay) from the police force, or forced to pay a substantial fine, as he is
about having to pay tort damages.
55. See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of stay); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S 465, 501 (1976)(Burger, C.J., concurring);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Amar, supra note 1, at 793-98; Stephen J. Markman, Six Observations on the
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 425, 432-33 (1997).
56. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 115.
57. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 58.
58. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 640, 645. According to a five-year study of
California data, illegal search and seizure problems were given as the reason for the
rejection of only thirteen of more than 14,000 forcible rape arrests (0.09%) and only eight
of approximately 12,000 homicide arrests (0.06%). See id. Another study, a three-state
(Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania) study by Peter Nardulli involving some 7,500 cases,
disclosed that none of the successful motions to exclude illegally seized evidence
"involved exceptionally serious cases such as murder, rape, armed robbery, or even
unarmed robbery." Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596 n.47.
59. Davies, supra note 58, at 680. The California data reveals that less than 0.3% (fewer
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It may be that search and seizure problems arise much less
frequently in murder, forcible rape, and other violent crime cases than
they do in drug and weapons possession cases. Myron Orfield
furnishes two other explanations, one encouraging, the other not.
The first explanation is that the more serious the crime, the greater
the officer's desire to see the perpetrator convicted and, because the
police care more about convictions in these cases, the more potent the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effects. 60 Moreover, "big cases" are
more likely to involve officers in specialized units "who are more
likely to take the time and care necessary to comply with the Fourth
Amendment."
61
The second explanation is that in "heater" cases (i.e., big cases that
have "the potential to arouse public ire" if the defendant "goes free"
62because the police violated the Fourth Amendment), many judges
will feel tremendous pressure to admit the illegally seized evidence
63
and will often find a way to do So. It is almost as if many judges, at
least those who have to run for re-election, have informally adopted
one law professor's proposal to make an exception to the exclusionary
rule in prosecutions for treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery,
and kidnapping. I find this an unfortunate and dispiriting65
development, but it is only one of a number of ways in which the
courts have accommodated the needs of law enforcement in the
than three in 1,000) of arrests for all non-drug offenses are rejected by prosecutors because
of illegal searches. Id. at 619. Davies estimates that "the cumulative loss of drug arrests at
all stages of felony processing in California is around 7.1 %." Id. at 681. In United States v.
Leon, the Court, per Justice White, estimated that "the cumulative loss due to
nonprosecution or nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is
probably in the range of 2.8% to 7.1%." 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
One may argue, as the Court did in Leon, that the small percentages of cases lost
because of the exclusionary rule "mask a large absolute number." Id. at 907 n. 6. As
Davies has pointed out, however, "raw numbers are not as useful for policy evaluation as
percentages. In a system as large as the American criminal justice system ... almost any
nationwide measurement or estimate will look large if expressed in raw numbers." Davies,
supra note 58, at 670.
60. See Orfield, supra note 50, at 82, 85, 115.
61. Id. at 115.
62. Id. at 116.
63. See id. at 115-23.
64. See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1046-49 (1974).
65. For extensive criticism of Professor Kaplan's proposal to limit the impact of the
exclusionary rule see Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1987). But see Stuntz, supra note 1,
at 447 ("[Tjhe visibility of the criminal who walks away [because of the exclusionary rule]
... makes courts see the consequences of [their rulings and may be] ... a way of limiting
counter-majoritarian excess.").
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exclusionary rule era.
The Warren Court has been disbanded for more than thirty years.
66Since then, with only a few exceptions, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have waged a kind of "guerilla warfare" against the law ofS 67
search and seizure. As a result, Judge Cardozo's oft-quoted criticism
of the exclusionary rule-"[t]he criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered" 68-is out of date. The Court has taken a
grudging view of what amounts to a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and has taken a relaxed view of
what constitutes consent to an otherwise illegal search or seizure; it
has so softened the "probable cause" requirement, so increased the
occasions on which the police may act on the basis of "reasonable
suspicion" or in the absence of any reasonable suspicion, and so
narrowed the thrust of the exclusionary rule that nowadays the
criminal only "goes free" if and when the constable has blundered
badly.
69
66. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that the use of a
thermal imager or, more generally, any "sense-enhancing" technology to obtain "any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general use") (citation omitted).
67. Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1442 (1987).
68. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
69. A dozen cases should suffice. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357 (1998) (concluding that exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings
even when officer who conducted illegal search was aware of person's parole status);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ruling that police may stop a motorist where
there are adequate grounds to believe that some traffic violation has occurred, even though
the stop is pretextual); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (ruling that police may
search dwelling house on "apparent authority" of a third party who lacks actual authority
to consent); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that in order
to combat drunk driving, police may stop all motorists at sobriety check points absent any
individualized suspicion); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (illustrating how little
is needed to constitute "reasonable suspicion" to stop suspect's car and to question her);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that police examination, for
evidence of crime, of contents of opaque sealed plastic trash bags left for collection not a
"search"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that police aerial
surveillance of a fenced-in backyard not a "search"); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640
(1983) (finding that police may search through shoulder bag at stationhouse inventory of
arrestee's effects, even though all the inventory objectives could be achieved "in a less
intrusive manner"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (replacing existing probable
cause structure with "totality-of-circumstances" test and stressing that probable cause is a
"fluid concept" and that it requires only a "substantial chance of criminal activity");
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (stating in passing that certain police-citizen
"encounters" or "contacts," such as asking a person at an airport to show her driver's
license and airline ticket, were not a "seizure"); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(finding that even though police lack any reason to believe that a car contains evidence of
crime, if they have adequate grounds to make a custodial arrest of driver, they may search
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Judge Calabresi argues that the downsizing of the Fourth
Amendment and the protections to privacy it provides, because of the
pressure the exclusionary rule puts on courts to avoid freein0 a guilty
defendant, should make liberals hate the exclusionary rule. I think
not.
A meaningful tort remedy or administrative sanction or any other
effective alternative to the exclusionary rule would also exert strong
pressure on courts to make the rules governing search and seizure
more "police-friendly." As Monrad Paulsen noted on the eve of the
Mapp case: "Whenever the rules are enforced by meaningful
sanctions, our attention is drawn to their content. The comfort of
Freedom's words spoken in the abstract is always disturbed by their
application to a contested instance. Any rule of police regulation
enforced in fact will generate pressures to weaken the rule. 71
There is no denying that one of the effects of the exclusionary rule
has been to diminish the protection provided by the Fourth
Amendment. But this is probably the price we would have had to pay
for any means of enforcing the Amendment that had a bite-one that
actually worked.
The only time the Amendment would not impose the societal costs
that critics of the exclusionary rule complain about-and the only
time it would not put pressure on the courts to water down the rules
governing search and seizure-would be if it were "an unenforced
• . . 72
honor code that the police may follow in their discretion."
VIII. JUDGE CALABRESI'S PROPOSAL
73 74
As Tracey Maclin has reminded us, ever since the 1930s,
commentators have deplored the inadequacies of existing tort
remedies against offending police officers and proposed various ways
the entire interior of the car, including closed containers found in that area, even after the
driver has been removed from the car and handcuffed); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that suspect may effectively consent to an otherwise unlawful
search even though he was never informed, and no evidence existed that he was ever
aware, of his right to refuse officer's request).
70. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 112. See also Slobogin, supra note 1 (arguing that
the exclusionary rule is systemically harmful to Fourth Amendment values).
71. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 256.
72. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 (1984)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 60 n.289.
74. See Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems,
3 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (1936); William T. Plumb, Jr., Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24
CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1939).
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to invigorate these remedies (although nothing seems to have come of
it). Therefore, I find quite noteworthy Judge Calabresi's view that, in
the ordinary unlawful arrest or illegal search case, tort remedies willS 75.
not work. I agree with him that, although jurors often identify with
the plaintiff in a tort action, they are unlike to do so when the
plaintiff is a criminal or a suspected criminal. However, I find the
alternative to the exclusionary rule that Judge Calabresi proposes
disappointing.
Judge Calabresi's proposal has two parts: First, after the person has
been convicted, a hearing would take place to determine whether the
police had obtained evidence illegally and, if so, whether the
officer(s) had done so inadvertently, negligently, willfully, or
wantonly. Based on the flagrancy of the police misconduct, the
defendant would then be given a reduction of two, three, or four• . . 77
points on the sentencing guidelines. Second, the officer or officers
who were found to have violated the Fourth Amendment would then
be subjected to a separate system of direct punishment which would
vary, depending upon the flagrancy of the misconduct. I assume that
one or more of the officer's superiors would determine what the
punishment should be.
A reduction of the prison sentence, based on the degree to which
the police violated the defendant's rights, is an unusual aspect of
Judge Calabresi's proposal. He assures us that this feature would
provide the defendant with a significant incentive to bring up the fact
that the evidence introduced by the state was obtained illegally.
Perhaps SO, 79 but the more relevant question is how, if at all, this part
of the judge's proposal would influence the police. Would it
constitute a disincentive-a means of eliminating, or at least reducing,
significant police incentives to illegal searches where the police
contemplate prosecution and conviction?80 I think not. This feature of
75. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 114.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 116.
78. See id. at 116-17.
79. Judge Calabresi assures us that since, under his proposal, the legality of the police
conduct would not be examined until the trial was over and the defendant convicted, the
prosecutor would lack any incentive to charge more. See id. at 116. But every
conscientious prosecutor would know at the outset, long before a post-trial hearing took
place, whether or not the police acted illegally in the case, or, at the very least, whether or
not there was a serious possibility that, at a post-trial hearing, one or more officers might
be found to have acted illegally.
80. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 431-32; Phillip Johnson, New
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Judge Calabresi's proposal would likely have no impact on the police
at all.
Chief Justice Burger once argued that the exclusionary rule does
not affect police officers' behavior.8' However, Myron Orfield's82
Chicago study strongly indicates otherwise. Every judge,
prosecutor, and public defender he interviewed expressed the belief
that "officers care about convictions and experience adverse personal
reactions when they lose evidence."
83
Under Judge Calabresi's proposal, however, the victim of the
police misconduct could be, and would be, convicted on the basis of
evidence the police obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
even when the violation was gross or willful. I am convinced that the
police do care whether the evidence they obtained leads to a
conviction or whether such evidence is thrown out by the court. But a
conviction is one thing; the length of the sentence is something else. I
find it hard to believe that the police care one whit whether the person
convicted on the basis of their unlawful acquisition of evidence is
sentenced to four years or five, ten months or twelve. From the
perspective of the police, the important thing-perhaps the only
thing-is that their actions resulted in the conviction of a criminal and
a substantial stretch of prison time for him. In other words, their
illegal actions "paid off."
Therefore, the efficacy of Judge Calabresi's proposed alternative to
the exclusionary rule must turn on the other half of his proposal-
what he calls a separate system of direct punishment of the individual
officer after a post-trial determination that the officer committed a
search and seizure violation.
84
Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 4 (Working Papers, Sept. 1978) (on file
in the University of Michigan Law Library), quoted in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 229-30 (5th ed. 1980) and cited in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 916 n.14 (1984).
81. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416-17 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
82. See Orfield, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 82. Those interviewed also believed that "police change their behavior in
response to the suppression of evidence" and that the operation of the exclusionary rule
"effectively educates officers in the law of search and seizure and that the law is not too
complicated for police officers to do their jobs effectively." Id.
For an earlier study by the same author of Chicago narcotics officers see the discussion
in note 54, revealing that officers experience "personal disappointment at the loss of a
potential conviction" and that "[tihe significant amount of time spent on these
investigations, together with their danger and uncertainty, create a strong emotional
commitment to conviction." Orfield, supra note 54, at 1042.
84. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 116.
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We can be fairly certain that if the police believed Judge
Calabresi's system of direct punishment for Fourth Amendment
violations would really work, they would resist its adoption for the
same reasons they would be unhappy about other systems of "direct
sanctions" against them (such as tort remedies) that really worked.
They would argue forcefully, and with some plausibility, that if six-
month suspensions without pay and/or substantial fines were imposed
on them for search and seizure violations (presumably the kind of
"direct punishments" Judge Calabresi contemplates), they "would be
afraid to conduct the searches they should make."85
Orfield's study of Chicago narcotics officers discloses that they
clearly preferred the exclusionary rule to a system of "directS 86 .
sanctions" against them. This finding may be somewhat misleading.
Few police are enamored of the exclusionary rule. If they had their
druthers, most would prefer the pre-Mapp days, when, in many states,
no viable means of enforcing the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure existed.87 However, the police would rather live
with an "indirect" sanction, like the exclusionary rule, than a direct
85. For an example of this line of thought, see Orfield, supra note 54, at 1053. See also
Stuntz, supra note 1:
[O]verdeterrence is a danger because the police have no strong incentive to undertake
the marginal (legal) search or arrest. The result is that the usual legal tool--damages,
fines, criminal punishment-are likely to cause more harm than good if they are
widely used. If an officer faces serious loss whenever he makes a bad arrest, he will
make fewer bad arrests, but also many fewer good ones.
Id. at 445.
86. See Orfield, supra note 54, at 1051-54.
87. See supra notes 10-29. But see Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24 (1980). This is, so far as I know, the
most comprehensive study of police attitudes toward the exclusionary rule. Loewenthal,
who taught police officer students at John Jay College of the City University of New York
at the time, conducted many interviews with police commanders on all levels, as well as
with the police officer students. He was also a participant-observer on forty tours of duty
concerning various phases of police work.
Professor Loewenthal found "strong evidence that, regardless of the effectiveness of
direct sanctions, police officers could neither understand nor respect a Court which
purported to impose constitutional standards on the police without excluding evidence
obtained in violation of those standards." Id. at 29. He also found that the police "have
great difficulty believing that standards can have any real meaning if the government can
profit from violating them," id. at 39, and that regardless of what substitute remedies may
be provided, the police "are bound to view the elimination of the exclusionary rule as an
indication that the fourth amendment is not a serious matter, if indeed it applies to them at
all." Id. at 30. See also Orfield, supra note 50, at 128 ("None of the narcotics officers
previously interviewed believed that the exclusionary rule should be abolished. Several
officers said they appreciated the rule because it gave them a reason, within their peer
group, to act properly. Some thought a 'good faith exception' would be appropriate.");
Orfield, supra note 54, at 1051-52 (same).
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one. Moreover, the exclusionary rule is not something the police can
fight and defeat in the political arena-it is a remedy that judges
control and can apply "without being dependent upon the actions of
other branches of government."
8 8
The police can, however, have a large effect on the alternatives to
the exclusionary rule, because other actors such as legislators,
prosecutors, and police brass control these.89 For one thing, the police
can invoke their formidable political clout9° to prevent a plan like
Judge Calabresi's from ever being adopted. Moreover, even if such a
plan were adopted, the police could prevent it from being applied in
appropriate cases.
Judge Calabresi's proposed system would probably not overcome
the resulting police resistance. But the greater danger is that a plan
like the judge's might be adopted, displacing the exclusionary rule,
yet rarely be enforced. It might turn out to exist only on aper.
One cannot help thinking of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, a case that
declined to apply the exclusionary rule to civil deportation
proceedings. One reason the Court gave for the conclusion it reached
was that the Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") "has its
own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment
violations by its officers"92 -a system of rules and regulations
restricting INS agents' conduct in dealing with aliens, a program for
giving new officers "instruction and examination in Fourth
Amendment law," and "a procedure for investigating and punishing
immigration officers who commit Fourth Amendment violations."-
These programs and procedures, the Court assured us, "reduce the
likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule."
94
The trouble was, as dissenting Justice White was quick to point out,
that the Lopez-Mendoza majority failed to cite "a single instance" in
which the INS procedures had been invoked. 95 Moreover, other
88. Morgan Cloud, Judicial Review and the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 835,
838 (1999).
89. See id.
90. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
91. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
92. Id. at 1044.
93. Id. at 1044-45.
94. Id. at 1045.
95. Id. at 1054 (White, J., dissenting). Nor did the INS claim that any of the eleven
officers terminated and any of the nine officers suspended in recent years for misconduct
toward aliens had been disciplined for Fourth Amendment violations, and it appears that
all the officers terminated "were terminated for rape or assault." Id. at 1055 n.2.
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portions of the majority opinion were likely to shake one's confidence
in the vaunted procedures the INS was supposed to have in place for
deterring, investigating, and punishing Fourth Amendment violations.
Even an "occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might
significantly change and complicate the character of [deportation]
proceedings," the Court told us, because "[n]either the hearing
officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings are likely to
• ,96
be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law." The
Court also indicated that application of the exclusionary rule to
deportation proceedings "might well result in the suppression of large
amounts of information that had been obtained entirely lawfully,"
because "INS arrests occur in crowded and confused
• ,,97
circumstances. Moreover, the Court told us that requiring INS
agents to keep "a precise account of exactly what happened in each
particular arrest" would be impractical, considering the "massed
numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens ... 98
To avoid a replay of the paper procedures for deterring Fourth
Amendment violations in place at the INS, I suggest that we proceed
slowly and cautiously with Judge Calabresi's proposal. As noted
earlier, many unlawful arrests and searches do not turn up any
incriminating evidence or result in any criminal prosecutions. In the
unlikely event that Judge Calabresi' s scheme of directly punishing the
offending officer is put in place, a better plan is to keep the
exclusionary rule in the first three to five years for instances of police
misconduct that result in criminal prosecutions and to use the new
One of the exclusionary rule's virtues is that "[c]laims are inexpensive to raise, and the
facts on which they rest usually do not involve much independent digging by defense
counsel." Stuntz, supra note 1, at 453. Moreover, the fact that the exclusionary rule is tied
to criminal prosecutions "ensures that lots of claims are raised, which in turn allows courts
to serve as reasonably good watchdogs for certain kinds of police misbehavior." Id. at 455.
96. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048.
97. Id. at 1049.
98. Id. at 1049-50. This led dissenting Justice White to say:
Rather than constituting a rejection of the application of the exclusionary rule in
civil deportation proceedings, however, [the majority's] argument amounts to a
rejection of the application of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of INS
agents. If the pandemonium attending immigration arrests is so great that
violations of the Fourth Amendment cannot be ascertained for the purpose of
applying the exclusionary rule, there is no reason to think that such violations can
be ascertained for purposes of civil suits or internal disciplinary proceedings,
both of which are proceedings that the majority suggests provide adequate
deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations.
Id. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting).
99. See supra note31.
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administrative sanctions against those officers whose misconduct
failed to produce any incriminating evidence. In the unlikely event
that an appraisal of the situation three or five years later demonstrates
that the judge's system of direct punishment really works-that police
officers are regularly punished for "the frequent infringements [of the
Fourth Amendment] motivated by commendable zeal" as well as for
"the grossest of violatons 1-there will be time enough to abolish
the exclusionary rule.
100. I have borrowed language from the lectures on search and seizure delivered by
Justice Potter Stewart shortly after he stepped down from the Supreme Court. Stewart,
supra note 1:
Taken together, the currently available alternatives to the exclusionary rule...
punish and perhaps deter the grossest of violations . . . . But they do little, if
anything, to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth amendment
violations-the frequent infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not
condemnable malice.
Id. at 1388-89. See also Cloud, supra note 88:
Remedies aimed directly at officers who break the law ... are rational methods
for pursuing the goal of deterring misconduct. Undoubtedly, they are more likely
to get the attention of individual officers than is the suppression of evidence in
criminal prosecutions. The problem, of course, is that no one seriously expects
that those remedies will be rigorously enforced in any but the most egregious
cases. This is true, in part, because enforcing those remedies is a task for other
government actors, including police departments and prosecutors. It is not a task
for judges ....
id. at 853.
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